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NO NEGLIGENCE IN CUFFS 
SECURED TOO TIGHT 
Forster v. Cineplex Odeon Corp. et al.,  
2001 BCSC 229 
 
Two police officers responded to a 
 
dismissing the plaintiff’s action against the officer, 
Lowry J. held, at para. 22: 
 
[I]t is my view, that no case of negligence, let alone gross 
negligence, has been made out in any event. Given that 
[the plaintiff] struggled to the extent he did in resisting 
the handcuffs being secured, he cannot be heard to 
complain that they were placed on his wrists too tightly call at a Cineplex Odeon Movie 
Theatre where ushers had forcefully 
evicted the plaintiff from the 
premises. As a result of this 
incident, the plaintiff sued the theatre alleging he was 
assaulted by the staff when evicted and the police for 
securing a set of handcuffs too tight. Officers 
attended and arrested the plaintiff, handcuffed him, 
and placed him in the rear of a police car in order to 
remove the plaintiff from the scene to calm him down. 
The officer stated the plaintiff was “ranting and 
exhibiting behaviour that was most bizarre”. The 
plaintiff was driven from the theatre but later 
returned and reunited with his girlfriend and children 
who were at the theatre.  
 
During the drive with the officer it had become 
apparent that the handcuffs on the plaintiff were too 
tight; a hand was turning blue. The Court found that 
the plaintiff had resisted being arrested and struggled 
while being handcuffed and that the handcuffs could 
not be easily double locked to avoid tightening. The 
handcuffs were either secured too tightly or tightened 
during the struggle. The transporting officer stopped 
to loosen the handcuffs but found that his key was not 
compatible because the handcuffs on the plaintiff 
belonged to the second officer involved in the arrest. 
The officer returned to the scene, obtained the other 
officer’s key, and released the plaintiff. The elapsed 
time during the transport of the plaintiff was 20 
minutes.  
 
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant officer was 
grossly negligent in permitting the handcuffs to 
become too tight and for using handcuffs that any 
handcuff key would not release (the officer’s 
handcuffs were older than the current issue; this 
explained why the keys were not interchangeable). In 
or that they were not double-locked to prevent them 
becoming tighter as he continued to struggle. And it 
simply cannot be said that [the defendant officer] was 
negligent because he did not decide to exchange the 
older handcuffs he was issued for newer handcuffs that 
had a universal key. It has not been established the 
decision was his to make. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca. 
 
RECOGNIZING AN APPARENT 
MENTAL DISORDER 
Part 5 of 6 
Mr. Richard Dolman 
 
The following notes are from an Internet website under 
development at the Justice Institute of BC to assist 
police to handle a psychiatric crisis and to promote 
wider understanding of mental illness. The project was 
initiated by the BC Association of Chiefs of Police 
Mental Health Committee, and is supported by a multi-
agency group. Funding is from the Ministry of Health 
Services and the Justice Institute. Comments and 
suggestions to the author are welcome at: 
almond@direct.ca 
 
Police need to make two key decisions when intervening 
under sec.28(1) of the Mental Health Act. Does the 
subject appear to have a mental disorder? Is the 
person’s behaviour likely to endanger themselves or 
others? If both answers are yes, police may apprehend 
and transport subject to hospital.  
However, the degree of apparent mental disorder must 
be more than eccentricity or odd ideas.  It must cause 
serious impairment of the subject’s ability to react 
appropriately to their environment, or to associate with 
others.  A suicide attempt, violence or psychosis are 
examples.  Here are some further points and a list of 
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Q: Police are not trained as psychiatrists. How can 
they recognize a psychiatric mental disorder? 
Officers should not attempt an exact diagnosis of any 
specific mental disorder. They do need to recognize 
abnormal behaviour or symptoms that indicate serious 
mental impairment and the need for psychiatric 
treatment. At the least, they can rely on instinct and 
on police experience to recognize behaviour well 
beyond the normal range.  Examples of such indicators 
are listed below. One or more of these symptoms are 
typical in a broad range of psychiatric disorders. 
Q: What is the psychiatric group of disorders? This 
group includes schizophrenia, bipolar (manic-
depressive) disorder, severe forms of depression, and 
severe anxiety disorders. These – and a few others - 
can generate disabling or crisis episodes which respond 
to treatment with anti-psychotic medications. Police 
may encounter untreated cases in this group, cases 
made worse by non-compliance with medications, or by 
intoxication. The group does not include a “single 
diagnosis” of certain brain conditions like Fetal Alcohol 
Syndrome, developmental disorders, or addiction, nor 
mild cases of neurosis by themselves, but can include a 
“dual diagnosis” – with co-existing psychiatric disorder. 
Q: What are the implications for police conduct? 
Human behaviour becomes more complex and more 
difficult to predict when it’s a mixture of normal 
rationality with symptoms of a mental disorder. People 
in psychiatric crisis often have distorted perceptions, 
slow communication, and magnified fears, yet retain 
some rationality. The key for effective police conduct 
is to look for and work with that rationality, while being 
patient about the heavy static.   When police approach, 
the person probably needs to feel non-threatened as 
well as getting offers of help. Police can encourage 
cooperation by treating the subject with normal 
respect and extra consideration, introducing 
themselves, speaking slowly in a firm but friendly 
manner.  
Command or force may be the only way to apprehend a 
dangerous or violent subject who is also psychotic.  But 
even then, for legal and humanitarian reasons, police 
are in a preventive role - protecting people from harm 
and restoring peace. This includes protection from 
self-harm as well as protecting others from harm.   
Q: What to do when a crisis call looks like a false 
alarm? Usually, a psychiatric crisis is obvious in the 
subject’s behavior or conversation, but some patients 
may not be willing or able to talk. Some “experienced” 
patients are able to mask symptoms temporarily. If 
police suspect a disorder is hidden, a few minutes of 
quiet conversation may tell. The Mental Health Act 
states collateral information (e.g. from family, partner 
or friends) is sufficient for police to decide that there 
appears to be a mental disorder and likely 
endangerment. 
Typical indicators of psychiatric mental disorders 
(one or more of the following):   
• COLLATERAL MEDICAL INFORMATION: 
Information received from informed sources about 
psychiatric symptoms or about previous history of 
psychiatric mental disorder diagnosis, treatment or 
hospitalization - usually reported by family, partner 
or friends.  (Receiving this information is a high 
priority, after immediate safety issues.) 
• PSYCHOSIS: Poor contact with reality; unaware or 
not reacting appropriately to surroundings or to 
others; generally irrational, bizarre behavior; 
hallucinations; delusions; belief in possessing special 
powers. 
• DISTURBED MOOD: Manic (rapid, pressured speech; 
elated mood; extremely energetic); deeply depressed 
(sad, crying, distressed, hopeless); flat mood (fixed 
expression, no emotions, no joy); severe anxiety 
(fear, panic); sustained and unjustified 
suspiciousness; frequent irritability, anger, 
aggressiveness; feeling isolated or alienated.  
• DISTURBED THINKING: Irrational or disordered 
thought and speech; disorganized; poor 
concentration, easily and severely distracted; 
confused about people, time, place; incoherent; 
impaired insight or judgment; poor problem-solving 
ability.  
• DISTURBED BEHAVIOR: Disrupted occupational or 
social relationships; poor coping: out of synch with 
daily realities & routines; bizarre appearance, 
behavior, or speech (well outside the normal range); 
inappropriate laughter; neglected personal health and 
hygiene. 
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 EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE: 
STREET CHECK SUPPORTED BY 
ARTICULABLE CAUSE 
R. v. Tammie, 2001 BCSC 366 
 
The accused was charged with 
addressing the second encounter and finding no 
violation of the accused’s rights, Mackenzie J. stated, 
at para. 21-24: 
 
I find [the officer] had articulable cause to detain [the 
accused] the second time. [The officer] had learned from 
C.P.I.C. that [the accused] was on probation, subject to a 
curfew and was not to possess knives. The brief search 
can be justified as a reasonable search for safety 
reasons…  murder. During the voire dire to 
determine the admissibility of 
evidence, the Court examined the 
conduct of the officer during a 
street check of the accused before the body of the 
victim had been discovered. A uniformed police officer 
checked the accused, who was walking alone on a 
sidewalk, at 3:47 am. The accused was one block from 
the Newton Inn on King George Highway, which was the 
location where the murder victim was subsequently 
located. The officer testified he stopped the accused 
because of a “rash” of break and enters in the area 
late at night and he just wanted to “verify him”. The 
officer exited his vehicle, approached the accused, and 
asked for his name, date of birth, address, and 
telephone number. The accused responded to the 
questions of the officer and the encounter only lasted 
for about two minutes. The officer returned to his 
vehicle and queried the accused on CPIC. As a result of 
the enquiry, the officer learned the accused was on 
probation, subject to a curfew and a prohibition against 
knives. The officer again approached the accused, 
initiated a general conversation about the probation 
order, and searched the accused. Nothing was found 
and the officer noted no signs of intoxication. The 
accused also told the officer that he had come from 
the Newton Inn (where the body of the victim was 
subsequently located). 
 
The accused argued that the officer failed to provide 
the accused with his right to counsel during the first 
encounter. It was also argued his statement that he 
had just come from the Newton Inn and the officer’s 
observation of his sobriety during the second 
encounter were inadmissible because the officer 
detained the accused and had failed to provide his s.10 
Charter warning and the pocket search infringed his 
s.8 Charter right to be secure from unreasonable 
search and seizure. Respecting the first encounter, the 
Court (in finding the accused was not detained and thus 
s.10 Charter was not triggered) acknowledged that the 
police are entitled to ask questions of a person 
although the person is free not to answer. In 
 
… [The officer] had articulable cause to detain [the 
accused] on the basis of the information from C.P.I.C. 
[The accused] was doubtless in breach of his curfew 
which added to the objective basis for articulable cause 
for the detention. The condition on [the accused’s] 
probation order requiring him not to possess knives 
objectively justified [the officer’s] subjective belief in a 
reason to briefly detain [the accused] - to check for 
knives in breach of the probation order.  
 
[The accused] apparently volunteered the explanation 
that he had just come from the Newton Inn, a well known 
pub, a couple of blocks away. An unwarned but 
volunteered statement is not obtained in violation of s. 
10(b)….  
 
In all the circumstances, including the fact it was 3:47 
a.m. in an area of frequent breakings and enterings and 
the fact [the accused] was on probation subject to the 
two stated conditions, I cannot find the failure to 
provide [the accused] his s. 10(b) Charter warning 
renders inadmissible [the accused’s] apparently 
volunteered statement that he had just come from the 
Newton Inn. That statement and [the officer’s] brief 
evidence about [the accused’s] state of sobriety is 
admissible in evidence. (references omitted) 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca. 
 
USE OF POLICE DOG 
NECESSARY & PROPORTIONATE 
Mohamed v. Vancouver (City) Police 
Department, 2001 BCCA 290 
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injuries he suffered after being 
apprehended by a police dog. A 
police canine officer received 
nformation that three men were involved in a robbery 
t a roadway intersection and attended the area 
hortly after receiving the information. The officer 
bserved three men fitting the description walking in 
he area. The officer stopped his vehicle and got out 
3
 along with his dog. The three men were walking away 
from the officer and the officer called “stop police”. 
One of the men stopped, and after a second call of 
“stop police” a second man stopped. The third man ran 
into a lane and the officer, after instructing the two 
men who stopped to lie down, set his police dog on the 
third man, who was the plaintiff. The police dog caught 
the plaintiff within a short distance as he was 
attempting to jump a small retaining wall. In the 
process, the plaintiff fell over the wall and broke his 
leg. The officer radioed for assistance while he was 
with the two men who had initially stopped. When back 
up arrived the officer ran looking for his dog, found 
the dog, and called the dog off. The plaintiff was 
arrested and an 18” blade was found at the base of the 
wall.  
 
The plaintiff alleged that the officer used excessive 
force, which was neither necessary nor reasonable in 
the circumstances, in setting the dog after him and 
was also negligent in failing to follow his dog 
immediately upon deployment. The plaintiff further 
contended that because the plaintiff suffered 
“grievous bodily harm” as a result of the dog’s use, the 
officer failed to comply with s.25(3) of the Code. The 
trial Court found that the plaintiff saw and heard the 
officer before the dog was released, a point the 
Appeal Court deemed critical to the analysis. The 
Appeal Court also found there was no evidence that the 
officer “intended to cause death or grievous bodily 
harm by releasing [the dog], or that he knew such 
consequences were “likely” to ensue”. The officer’s use 
of the dog in these circumstances were justified and 
the force used was “necessary and proportionate in the 
circumstances”. 
 





R. v. Lau, 2001 BCSC 346 
 
Police drug squad members made an 
unannounced and “violent entry”, as 
handcuffing him. In the basement police found a 252 
plant marihuana grow operation. Police stated that they 
sought to surprise and gain quick control over the 
occupants by the no-knock tactic which was claimed to 
be safer for the police and anyone found inside. The 
prevailing drug squad policy at the time also reflected 
this view. Two veteran police officer’s, testifying at 
the trial, suggested that “the execution of search 
warrants is one of the most dangerous of activities for 
police officers”. The court found that “second guessing 
the police officers in the conduct of these inherently 
dangerous operations is inappropriate” and “it would be 
absurd to hold that police officers must annually 
monitor the numbers of suspects keeping weapons at 
grow operations before they can justify a policy 
formulated to meet genuine concerns about protecting 
the lives and safety of both searchers and home 
occupants”. In admitting the evidence, the Court held: 
 
The warrant to search [the accused’s] home was lawfully 
obtained. The unannounced battering down of the door 
was an inherently unreasonable beginning to the ensuing 
search, but having regard to the purpose for which the 
police chose not to announce their presence before 
breaching the door, admitting the evidence discovered 
during the search will not bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute. (emphasis added) 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca. 
 
CONSENT SEARCH INVALID: 
POLICE TRICK OCCUPANT  
R. v. Adams (2001) Docket:C34243 
(OntCA) 
 
Police attended a rooming house and 
purportedly obtained the consent of 
the superintendent of the building, 
who shared a laundry facility with 
the accused, to enter the laundry 
room where the accused was ultimately arrested. A 
subsequent search of the accused resulted in the 
discovery of a controlled drug that led to the charges 
before the Court. At issue was the entry of the police 
into the laundry room to arrest the accused. If the 
entry to arrest was unlawful, the resultant search described by the judge, when they 
executed a search warrant by 
breaking down the accused’s door 
with a battering ram, entering with their guns drawn, 
and forcing the accused to the floor; subsequently 
incidental to the arrest would be unreasonable as the 
arrest forms the foundation for such a search. The 
unanimous Court rejected the Crown’s submission that 
the application of R. v. Feeney [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13, which 
generally prohibited warrantless entry into a dwelling 
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 to affect an arrest, is restricted to a suspect’s 
dwelling and held the rule applies equally to the 
dwelling of a third party. Secondly, the accused 
disputed the superintendent’s consent to enter because 
the police tricked the superintendent by stating their 
purpose in entering was to investigate a noise complaint 
when their real purpose was to arrest the accused. 
Although not prohibiting third party permission, the 
Court held the consent of the third party (the 
superintendent of the rooming house) in this case was 
not properly informed because of the trick. Thus, the 
entry and search were unreasonable and the evidence 
was excluded. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca. 
 
ODOUR & OTHER 
CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFIES 
ARREST  
R. v. Schulz, 2001 BCCA 601 
 
Local police received a fax from an 
outside agency requesting they 
inform the accused that Crown 
Counsel was not pursuing criminal 
charges for possession of marihuana against the 
accused (resulting from an earlier arrest) and that he 
was entitled to the return of his $4000 seized by 
police. No phone number was provided. A police officer 
attended the address specified in the fax and knocked 
on the door. A voice from within the premises stated 
“come-in” and the officer opened the door and 
observed the accused seated at the table. The accused 
immediately got up and closed the door behind the 
officer. The officer detected the odour of burning 
marihuana from within the residence, advised the 
accused of this, and that the residence would be 
searched as a result. The officer arrested the accused 
for possession of a controlled substance and advised 
the accused of his right to counsel. The officer called 
for back-up and a second officer arrived to assist. The 
back-up officer entered the residence to “ensure that 
no other persons were present in the premises and to 
preserve any evidence”. The investigating officer then 
left the residence with the accused in custody and 
returned to the police office where he conducted 
investigative follow-up. 
 
The back-up officer sat outside the accused’s 
residence in his police vehicle, but because of heavy 
rain beating on the vehicle roof, traffic, and other 
noise, went back into the accused’s residence and 
stood in the front room for approximately 30 
minutes until the investigating officer arrived with a 
search warrant. As a result of the search, a quantity 
of marihuana and psilocybin was seized. At trial, the 
judge found the odour of the marihuana along with 
the other circumstances amounted to reasonable 
grounds justifying the arrest. With respect to the 
searches by the back-up officer, the first entry was 
justified as incidental to arrest while the second was 
unreasonable because it was made out of convenience 
and was therefore a trespass. The accused appealed 
to the BCCA arguing, among other grounds, the 
arrest was unlawful because there were insufficient 
grounds upon which to base the arrest, the incidental 
search was thus unreasonable, and the evidence 
should have been excluded. In finding sufficient 
grounds for arrest, Donald J.A. for a unanimous 
Court of Appeal: 
The odour that the officer detected, together with the 
behaviour of the appellant in quickly moving to exclude 
the officer once the appellant saw who was at the door, 
combined to provide a sufficient basis for the belief 
founding the arrest. 
While it may be an available inference, as was argued, 
that the appellant was merely trying to exercise his right 
to privacy when he saw who was at the door the officer 
was entitled to draw the other inference that the 
appellant was attempting to conceal that he was smoking 
marihuana. 
We were given an extensive canvass of the cases about 
the question of the sufficiency of odour of marihuana as 
a basis for an arrest or for a search warrant. I think, 
however, that while the circumstances of each case 
differ it cannot be said … that odour alone will never be 
enough. 
With respect to the searches by the back-up officer 
the BCCA found the initial search to be incidental to 
arrest. However, the second search made out of 
convenience resulted in no evidence to be excluded. 
The appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca. 
Note-able Quote 
“It is not to be expected that a police officer is to be 
subjected to physical assaults in the execution of his 
duty for the protection of the public at large.  Nor is it 
any part of the duty of policemen to adopt discretion in 
place of valour in the discharge of their duties in the 
many hazardous circumstances in which they have to act.  
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 In my view it is of the utmost importance that this 
Court express its deep disapproval of the conduct of 
people in assaulting police officers, and it is our duty and 
responsibility to protect the police who carry on their 
function for the protection of all of us1." OntCA Justice 
Jessup  
 
DOG BITE OF FLEEING YOUTH 
REASONABLE 
R. v. M. & M., 2000 BCPC 185 
 
A police canine officer received a 
call for assistance just past 
midnight where two suspicious males 
had been observed by other 
officers who were on special 
assignment in the area on another matter. The canine 
officer joined these two officers in their vehicle when 
two males were observed emerging from a lane. The 
canine officer left the vehicle with his dog and when he 
was about half a block from the two males the officer 
called out; “Vancouver police, stop or I will send my 
dog, don’t move.” One of the males ran towards a school 
grounds and the officer gave the command “take him”. 
The dog apprehended the youth by biting onto his arm, 
and pulled the youth to the ground. The officer called 
to the youth, “show me your hands”. When the youth 
complied, the dog released. The injured sustained by 
the youth were “more extensive” than the officer 
believed the youth had suffered. The accused argued 
that the sending of the dog after the youth amounted 
to excessive force and violated the youths 
constitutionally protected right to security of the 
person (s.7 Charter) because there were possibly a 
dozen police officers in the area (on the unrelated 
matter) which prevented the youth from fleeing. The 
trial judge however, was satisfied the officer was not 
aware of the positions of the other officers and found 
the force used to be reasonable: 
 
Section 25 of the Code provides some protection to 
police officers in taking reasonable steps in effecting an 
arrest of an individual suspected of having committed a 
criminal offence. Section 25 (1) provides that a police 
officer is justified, if he acts on reasonable grounds in 
doing what he is authorized to do as long as the officer 
uses as much force as is necessary for that purpose. It 
must follow that one such purpose exists when a police 
officer effects an arrest. I believe that a police officer 
has the protection provided in this subsection provided 
his action is reasonable. [The canine officer], in my view, 
made an honest determination that this youth was fleeing 
the scene to avoid being arrested and under these 
circumstances his action of releasing the police dog was 
not excessive. 
                                                 
1 R. v. MacKay [1970] O.J. No. 920  (QL) (Ont.C.A.) 
 
 
The accused were convicted of break and enter. 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca. 
 
POLICE POSE AS LAWYER: 
TRICK NOT UNFAIR 
R. v. Caster, 2001 BCCA 633 
 
The accused appealed his murder 
conviction arguing the police ruse in 
posing as the accused’s lawyer to 
elicit information from a witness 
was so egregious that it was an 
abuse of process and violated the accused’s right to 
make full answer and defence (rights protected by s.7 
and s.11(d) of the Charter). Two undercover police 
officers went to the home of an uncooperative witness 
and introduced themselves as associates of the 
accused from jail. The witness invited the officers into 
his bedroom where the officers told the witness that 
the accused was concerned he may testify against him 
and sought assurances he would not testify for the 
Crown. The officers told the witness that the 
accused’s lawyer provided a list of questions and 
wanted the answers recorded on tape. The witness 
expressed concern that the undercover officers were 
police. To dissuade suspicion, the officers reiterated 
they were there on behalf of the accused’s lawyer and 
pointed to a third undercover officer, posing as the 
lawyer, who was standing outside the witnesses 
apartment building (a visual prop to enhance the 
credibility of the two undercover officers). 
 
Volume 1 Issue 12 
November 2001 
6
The witness asked to speak to the lawyer (the third 
police officer standing outside the apartment) but was 
informed by the undercover officers that there was no 
reason to do that. The witness testified the officers 
looked like criminals and were intimidating. After 
speaking to the witness, the officers left and returned 
within ten minutes to arrest the witness for being an 
accessory after the fact (the witness had held the 
accused’s backpack which contained a handgun, possibly 
the murder weapon). Following the arrest, police 
obtained a cautioned statement from the witness under 
oath. The accused contended that the “prosecution of 
the appellant contravened the community's sense of 
 decency and fair play and thus undermined the 
integrity of the judicial process” and the “investigative 
technique [the lawyer ruse] used to obtain evidence 
from [the witness] constituted a serious abuse of state 
power, warranting judicial intervention by way of a stay 
of proceedings to protect the solicitor/client 
relationship essential to the administration of the 
adversary system of justice…”. The BCCA disagreed 
and dismissed this ground of appeal, at para.32: 
 
I acknowledge the impersonation of defence counsel by a 
police officer may in some circumstances detract from 
the credibility of the defence bar, affect their ability to 
deal with witnesses, and thereby cause the adversary 
system to suffer. But I am not persuaded the appellant 
has established this to be one of those "clearest of 
cases" where the police conduct disentitles the Crown to 
a conviction.   
 
The second ground of appeal, alleging the police 
conduct prevented the accused from making full 
answer and defence to the charge, was also dismissed. 
The Court found the “trial judge preserved basic 
procedural fairness for the [accused], while at the 
same time ensuring that the community's interest in 
the truth was satisfied”. It must be noted that at the 
time when the police posed as the lawyer in this case, 
there was no offence. Since this case, the Legal 
Profession Act has been changed to prohibit this 
conduct: 
 
s.15(4)(a) Legal Profession Act 
A person must not falsely represent himself, herself or 
any other person as being (a) a lawyer, … 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca. 
 
PUBLIC INTEREST BROADER 
THAN s.495(2) FACTORS 
Collins v. Brantford Police Services Board, 
(2001) Docket:C34623 (OntCA) 
 
The plaintiff, who was arrested 
twice, sued the police and was 
awarded damages. The Brantford 
Police Services Board appealed the 
lower courts findings with respect 
to the first arrest and the Ontario Court of Appeal 
allowed the appeal. Police arrested the plaintiff for 
assault 3 hours after he had sprayed the 71-year-old 
victim with a water hose. There was a history of 
discord between the plaintiff and his neighbours and 
the victim feared for her safety. At trial, the court 
found the arrest was unlawful because the police did 
not comply with s.495(2) of the Criminal Code. The trial 
judge found he could not “conclude that the arrests 
were necessary to prevent the continuation or 
repetition of the offences or the commission of 
another offence”. A Divisional Court dismissed an 
appeal. On further appeal, the OCA examined the 
proper interpretation of s.495 of the Code and the 
protection against arbitrary detention under s.9 of the 
Charter. The Court found the police had the requisite 
reasonable grounds to believe the accused had 
committed an indictable offence. Assault, being a 
hybrid offence, is an indictable offence for the 
purposes of arrest because it could be prosecuted by 
indictment. The second question was whether the 
limitations on arrest in s.495(2) made the arrest 
unlawful because the police failed to comply with them. 
The Court held the person arrested has the burden of 
proving the arrest was unlawful by satisfying the Court 
the police failed to comply with s.495(2): 
 
Thus, in the words of s.495(2), it was for the [person 
arrested] to establish that [the arresting officer] believed 
on reasonable grounds that the public interest, having 
regard to all the circumstances, could be satisfied without 
arresting him. 
 
In this case, the plaintiff failed to meet this burden. 
Furthermore, the factors listed in s.495(2) are not an 
exhaustive list of what is to be considered by the 
officer: 
 
The decision mot to make a warrantless arrest for a hybrid 
offence must be made in the public interest having regard 
to all the circumstances. The factors enumerated in 
s.495(2)(d) are only some, albeit the most important, of 
the factors to which the officer’s attention is expressly 
directed. The overriding consideration remains the public 
interest.  
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca. 
SAFETY SEARCH 
UNREASONABLE               
R. v. Slawter, 2001 BCPC 246 
Two police officers on routine 
vehicle patrol in a downtown park 
area at 3 o’clock in the afternoon 
observed a man, among a group of 
men, appear to exchange something 
with another man. The officers knew the area as one 
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 where drug transactions frequently occurred. The 
officer testified he was “fairly confident” that he had 
witnessed a drug transaction. Police stopped their car, 
exited, and approached the accused. The officer said 
he wanted to talk to the accused “…to get an idea of 
what was going on” and to determine if the accused was 
involved in a drug transaction. Because the officer 
knew that many people in that area carried knives or 
sharp objects, he asked the accused if he had any. The 
accused replied he had a knife and the officer then 
handcuffed and searched the accused for weapons. 
The officer testified he handcuffed people he deals 
with in the park for “officer safety” when people he is 
dealing with indicate they have something when asked 
about weapons or sharps. The officer further stated 
he was concerned with his safety because the accused 
said he had a knife. During the search, the officer 
found the accused’s knife along with some cocaine. The 
accused was charged and argued the cocaine should be 
excluded as being the product of an unreasonable 
search. The Provincial Court judge found the 
circumstances did not justify the search, and 
therefore the search was unreasonable and the 
evidence was excluded:  
In this case the officer was not dealing with the 
commission of an offence, he was simply "fairly 
confident" that he had seen a drug transaction and he 
wanted to talk to the accused to get and idea of what 
was going on. Essentially the officer decided to go fishing 
for additional information. At the initial stage of his 
inquiry the officer did not have sufficient grounds to 
justify detaining or arresting the accused for possession 
of a controlled substance or for possession for the 
purpose of trafficking. At best, what the officer had 
seen was suspicious behaviour by the accused. Suspicion, 
however, is not a substitute for evidence. The officer, 
nonetheless, had the right to speak to the accused. He 
also was entitled to ensure that he could do so safely. 
Assuming that the officer was only concerned about his 
personal safety and that of his partner it was 
appropriate to ask the accused if he had a weapon or 
anything sharp with him. When the accused replied that 
he had a knife the officer was then entitled to ask the 
accused to turn the knife over to the officer. Taking all 
possible precautions however, the officer decided to 
handcuff the accused and search him to obtain the knife 
rather than ask him to surrender or to disclose the 
location of his knife. He obviously had detained the 
accused when he placed him in handcuffs. However in 
that condition the accused no longer presented any 
personal safety threat to either of the officers.  
The officer did not have reasonable or probable grounds 
to search the accused for evidence of a possible drug 
transaction because the circumstances observed by the 
officer would not legally support such a search. If the 
officer's purpose in searching the accused was to 
retrieve the knife the accused said he had in his 
possession then he had to do so in a reasonable manner. A 
reasonable search to ensure ones safety ought to be done 
in a manner that aims at determining where the knife is 
and then requesting that the knife be turned over to the 
officer or to retrieve the knife from where he was told 
it was located. If the accused had refused to tell the 
officer where the knife was or if he refused to turn the 
knife over to the officer, then the officer would be 
called upon to determine if he could legally continue to 
pursue his desire to conduct a search of the accused. 
The accused, however, was under no obligation to assist 
the officer and he ought not to have been searched for 
anything other than the knife, if at all, at the time he 
was searched in this case. 
…[T]he officer in this case never did tell the accused why 
he was interested in wanting to talk to him. The accused 
co-operated with the officer when he was told to stop. 
He also answered the police officer's questions about 
[having] something sharp or having a weapon. He was 
never asked to produce the knife nor was he asked where 
the knife was located. He was immediately handcuffed 
and searched. There was no suggestion whatsoever that 
the accused physically presented any form of personal 
threat to either of the police officers. 
… I am satisfied that the search and seizure undertaken 
by the arresting officer was an unreasonable search and 
seizure that violates section eight of the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms. The circumstances surrounding the 
search do not justify the actions taken by the officer. 
This was a search that at least borders on being 
arbitrary. The circumstances observed by the officer do 
not justify the manner in which the accused was treated. 
The search was not justifiable and therefore was an 
unreasonable search. The officer was not operating under 
any kind of emergency circumstances nor was he in a 
position to arrest the accused unless he could obtain 
more evidence than what he had originally observed.  
The results of searches of this type obviously support 
the opinion the officer had when he decided to determine 
what the accused had been doing. However the officer's 
actions were carried out in a manner that resulted in an 
unreasonable search and seizure and one that is not 
justified because of the circumstances under which it 
was conducted. The seriousness of the initial stop was 
minimal and the scope of the search was too broad. To 
admit evidence obtained in this manner would bring more 
disrepute to the administration of justice than to 
exclude it. (emphasis added) 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca. 
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